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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
April 13, 1984 Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 83-1378
\)~

Cert to CA 6
(Edwards, Contie, Spiegel)

KAVANAUGH, et al.

v.

LUCEY

Federal/Civil

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Petr challenges the federal courts' con-

clusi~n that resp was deprived of his due process right to effec-

(
"----

- - - --~~~~....,.....-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------oc:rge~ ..c;--

.

I~

tive assistance of counsel by his counsel's failure to perfect an
appeal.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

state court of drug trafficking.

Resp was convicted in

Resp's retained counsel filed

an appellate brief, but he failed to file a Statement of Appeal,
as required by Kentucky law, and his appeal was dismissed.
Resp then filed a habeas corpus action in federal DC,
contending that he had been deprived of effective assistance of
counsel on appeal.

During the course of proceedings, resp and

petr stipulated that there was no equal protection violation.
The DC granted the petition, although it stayed the writ to permit the state to reinstate petr's direct appeal.
firmed.

(

The CA af-

Although the states are not required to create an a.ppel-

------

late system, the federal courts on habeas can correct violations
_____...;

of due process that occurred in the course of appellate proceedings.

E.g., Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).

Resp's coun-

sel's blunder in seeking an appeal denied petr effective assist
ance of counsel and thereby violated due process.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

As long as the state's procedural

rules comport with the requirements of due process and equal protection, the state constitutionally may dismiss an appeal that
does not comply with the rules.
684, 687 (1894).

See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S.

The Sixth Amendment by its terms applies to

"criminal prosecutions" not appeals.

And this Court's cases on

the rights of indigents in the appeals process have rested on
equal•protection, that is concededly not violated in this case.

(

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956}; Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708 (1961}; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963}.
Resp: Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974}, established
that the Due Process as well as the Equal Protection clause
places constraints upon the state's operation of its appellate
processes.

The Court has established that an indigent's appel-

late counsel must provide a minimum level of competent representation.

Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967}; Anders v. Cali-

fornia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967}.

The CAs have reached the same re-

sult as the decision here in indistinguishable factual circumstances.
1972}

See, e.g., Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942, 949-950 (CA7

(opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, then Circuit Judge} ; Leventhal

v. Gavin, 396 F.2d 441 (CAl 1968}. (The response includes three
(

pages listing citations to cases from the CAs and the state
courts.

Resp, at 9-10, 12-13.}

If resp's attorney negligently

failed to file the petition in accord with the state court's
rules, a sanction should be imposed upon the attorney, rather
than requiring the client to forfeit his legal rights.~, 496
F. 2d 1274, 1278 (CA5 1974}.
4.

DISCUSSION:

As resp observes, there are a ~ st of

cases holding that a defendant was denied effective assistance of
counsel where counsel's error effectively denied defendant a
right of appeal.

Those cases seem to be generally distinguish-

able in two ways.

They generally (although not always} involve

~

appointecytather than retained counsel; and they rest upon factors in addition to the mere failure to comply with the state's
I

(

rules of appellate procedure, such as that attorney was negligent

r-

page

4.

or inept or that a good faith effort to comply with the rules was
made, at least by the defendant.

E.g., Horsley v. Simpson, 400

F.2d 708, 711-712 CA5 1968); Rosinski v. United States, 450 F.2d
59 (CA6 1972); Blanchard v. Brewer, 429 F.2d 89, 91-92 (CA8
1970).

--

Here, in contrast, the feder 1 court found ineffective

as~nce on the basis ~ 01§

of retained counsel's failure to

comply with the rules of the appellate court.

It does not appear

from the papers filed here that resp was indigent at the time of
his trial or appeal.
It is true that the present decision deprives the state
of all power to enforce its procedural rules on appeal.

If coun-

sel's failure ~to comply with those rules leads to dismissal, the
appellant has received ineffective assistance of counsel and must
be permitted to appeal again with new counsel.

f

The courts are

well familiar with the tension between relieving a defendant of
the consequences of counsel's error and enforcing state rules of
procedural default.

The tension is particularly acute when eval-

uating claims of ineffective assistance at the appellate stage
because counsel's failure to take the simple steps required to
perfect an appeal seems to be in itself sufficient to establish
incompetence.

___________ _

.._ way out of this dilemma, implicit in the CA
One

decisions such as those noted above, is to require on habeas at

~

least some evidence that the failure to comply with appellate
~

._

.

rules was hot a tactic deliberately adopted by counsel or defend<

ant.

'{"-

I would not grant this case plenary consideration.

(

t5&-

~h-u

-------------------

It

appears, as noted above, that the CAs have adopted an approach

that leaves some efficacy to state procedural rules.

(

decision appears to be an unfortunate aberration.

The present

Petr neither

cites a conflict nor shows that the CAs in elaborating the doctrine of ineffective assistance generally have eviscerated state
procedural rules.

Further, the case does not promise to clarify

the narrow issue that it raises.

Petr's brief focuses upon the

question whether there is any constitutional right to effective
assistance of appellate counsel and emphatically denies that the
Due Process clause speaks to the question.

In light of the sub-

stantial body of precedent on this subject in the federal courts,

/r,o, ,5'

Y)

including this Court, pe¥f •s approach to the problem seems mis-

'-'

guided.

In sum, the Court should wait to see whether other CAs

adopt the indiscriminate approach to appellate ineffective as-

--------

------------

---

sistance cases exemplified here before itself taking up the mat-

(

ter.

Summary reversal would not be unreasonable, as the decision below does deprive state appellate procedural rules~ of all

-----~-----------The difficulty with summary reversal

effect.

'-~-c::::> l

is that the Court

s)lould announce no general standard for this area without plenary
consideration.

An opinion reversing summarily could say only

that the present decision went "too far," without indicating how
far was far enough.
IFP Status: Petr has submitted the necessary affidavit.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend denial.

There is a response.
April,4, 1984

(
'-

Charny

Opin in petn
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No. 83-1378, Kavanaugh (Prison Superintendent) v. Lucey
Memorandum for File
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary reading of the briefs.
The opinions below and the briefs of the parties are,
for the most part, poorly written.

This is not unusual in

Kentucky cases, though the federal court opinions in this
case are no credit to either of them.
Respondent (defendant) was convicted of drug offenses
in state court.

His appeal (apparently to the Kentucky

Court of Criminal Appeals) was dismissed because his retained
lawyer failed to file the Statement of Appeal required by
Kentucky law.

Apparently this is a procedural requirement

that resulted in dismissal even though counsel had filed a
timely brief and otherwise had complied with Kentucky procedure.
The Kentucky Constitution, by an Amendment in 1974, confers the
right of appeal from a criminal conviction.
In this Federal Habeas Corpus proceeding the DC found
a due process violation of the Federal Constitution where
the appeal was denied because of the "ineffective assistance of
counsel".

The DC conditioned granting of the Writ on Kentucky

now allowing appeal or retrying the defendant.
The Court of Appeals (CA 6) affirmed, quoting from and
pgreeing with the DC's decision.

We granted cert apparently

3.

No. 83-1378

sense between an equal protection and a due process violation.
Petitioner responds that the Griffin line of cases all turned
on discrimination against indigents, a factor absent in this
case as defendant had retained counsel and does not base his
claim on indigency.
If I had represented the defendant, I would have based
my argument primarily on the fact that the Kentucky constitution
confers a right to appeal and that effective assistance of
counsel is necessary to enjoy that right.
not argue the case that way.

Yet respondent does

Rather, he seems to say that

whatever may be the law in the states, the federal constitution
requires effective assistance of counsel on state appeal.
I have not read the federal cases, even those by our Court.
Respondent's brief sites an array of cases that are said to
support his position (see Appendix to Brief), and claims that
there is not a single case to the contrary.

The case is an

interesting one, and I will be interested in my Clerk's views.

LFP

.,

No. 83-1378
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I. Facts and Decisions Below.
Resp was

found

guilty by a

jury

in

the Madison

Circuit Court of trafficking in LSD and cocaine.

{Ky.)

The court en-

tered final judgment on March 29, 1977 and retained counsel filed
a

timely

notice

of

appeal.

In addition,

counsel prepared

record and filed a brief with the Ky. Ct. App. on time.

the

In the

brief, he argued that the admission of certain photographs, the
jury charge, and the prosecutor's comments during summation each
constituted reversible error.
The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on
the ground

that resp had failed

l.095{a) {1).
contain

to comply with Ky.

R.

App.

P.

This rule requires that the Ky. Ct. App. pleadings

"[t] he

same

information as

required

in a

statement of

appeal in the Supreme Court pursuant to RAP 1.090."

Ky. R. App.

P. 1.090, in turn, requires various information such as the names
of the parties, the names and addresses of counsel, the name and
address of the trial judge, the date of judgment and of the notice of appeal, and various procedural information.

All of this

information appears to have been contained in the other documents
petr submitted for the appeal.
The Ky. Ct. App. dismissed the appeal because "the appellant

failed

l.095{a) {1) ."
sideration and

'

to

App. 37a.
the Ky.

supply

the

information

required

by

RAP

It also denied resp's motion for reconS.Ct.

later

refused

review,

thereby af-

firming the dismissal.
Resp filed for habeas in E.D.Ky.
adopted

{Moynahan, J.).

The DC

the magistrate's report and recommendation, which found

No. 83-1378
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~~~~d,._,.

~ ~~f- HJ ~ ~
~ ~~ - ~

, _,.,.~

/4~

I>~ ~~ -

that : : ~ "was denied the effective assistance of counsel on ap- ~
peal · when his
Appeal,

retained

attorney

thereby resulting

in

failed

...

to

file

dismissal

... '

the DC then granted habeas relief.

a Statement of
II

App.

60a, and

Its judgment stayed the writ

-

for 120 days in order to give the State an opportunity to rein-

~ state resp's direct appeal

~

kJ

~,,,_ t--,.;u,

~
oY-'
.-,<£~

l'i«_.tl~

~ initiate P:_?~edin~ s to ,::_try him.

It also referred the conduct of resp's counsel

(the same as his

counsel on habeas) to the Board of Governors of the Ky. State Bar
Assoc.
On first appeal, the CA6 refused to pass on the ineffective assistance claim.

Instead, it remanded the case for deter-

mination of whether the dismissal violated equal protection since
no

such

action

appeared

under similar facts.

to

have been

taken

in any other case

Judge Jones dissented, simply stating that

"[a]ppellate counsel's failure to comply with Kentucky's Rule of
Appellate Procedure l.095(a) (1), causing dismissal of the appeal
without a consideration of the merits, is ineffective assistance
of counsel violative of due process."
547, 548 (1981)

Lucey v. Seabold, 645 F.2d

(original emphasis).

On remand, both parties agreed that an evidentiary hearing was

unnecessary.

They stipulated that no equal protection

issue existed in the action.
the writ previously granted.

Resp then asked the DC to reissue
The DC agreed

writ for the same period as before.

·

to but stayed the

Its memorandum opinion, more

be

thorough than before, relied exclusively on CA6 precedent recognizing a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

~

//J

ff
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On second appeal,
"since

there

is

the CA6 rejected Ky's argument that

'no constitutional due

process

entitlement

to

state-court appeal[] and assistance of counsel (it exists only at
trial)

it

is clear

that

[resp]

suffered

no constitutional

deprivation when his state appeal was lawfully dismissed.'"
65a.
ate

App.

Although the CA6 recognized that due process does not ere-

-===--

a

right

(1894),
that

to

it held

appeal,

that once a

system must

precedent,

see

McKane

v.

Durston,

u.s.

153

684

state creates an appellate system

comport with due process.

Following

its own

the CA6 held that counsel's failure to file all the

necessary

appellate

appellate counsel.

papers

violated

resp' s

right

to ef fee ti ve

It accordingly affirmed the DC judgment.

II. Discussion.
Both parties misun~rstaru3 the case.
that

a

right

The State argues

to effective assistance of appellate counsel can

stem only from the right to an appeal.

And this Court, it cor-

rectly points out, has held that the Constitution does not guarantee

such

a

since appeal
procedural

right.

McKane

v.

Lt....J-r.-wf

is permissive,

requirements

-'\

IN-,~ 7)

Durston,

supra.

In

the State can condition

it wishes.

Any other regime,

its

view,

it on any
it adds,

would make state appellate rules virtually unenforceable since a
defendant could

"cure"

any default by claiming ineffective as-

sistapce.
Resp, on the other hand, points out that the Ky. Con-

.._________,

----~--------------__,.

stitution grants a right to a direct appeal, Ky. Const.,

§115,

and argues that this right is meaningless unless accompanied by a

IL,

rc<:sritt "

r
~
~.-,~
~

No. 83-1378

right
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effective

assistance

of

counsel.

He

also correctly

notes that the state and lower federal courts have uniformly held
that such a right exists.

The State, in turn, argues that these

cases all rest on equal protection grounds, which, it was stipulated, is not an issue here.

Resp disagrees.

The majoE.._~blem with both sig,es'
t he

right

arguments

is that Jlu.,1...:/-

'--t>

to effective assistance.

- - - - . . . . . _ _ _ ; : . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1

Both wrongly assume that it must spring from a right to a

~

eal. ~ ~

They disagree only about where this right to appeal must be lo- = - ~
cated: the State insisting that it must be located in the federal ~ a -

~tJConstitution,

while

resp argues

perhaps a statute will do.

that the state constitution or

~

There are of course many other legal ~ -

problems in the roads they travel, · but because their initial assumptions

are so mistaken there is not much point in developing

and evaluating

their

subsequent arguments.

the right to effective assistance

Once the ~ of

is properly located,

most of

J

I

the difficulties in the case disappear.

/(summary

In Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982)
aff irmance),

this Court

(per curiam)

identified the source of this

right.

In that case, a state prisoner's retained counsel failed

to file

a

s.ct.

cert petn with

dismissed

the

the

Fla.

application.

s.ct.

on time and

The prisoner

then

the Fla.
filed

habeas in DC contending that his retained counsel's failure
file ,on time violated his right to effective assistance.
denied the writ because

for
to

The DC

it believed that his counsel's failure

did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair.

In reaching

)./J.~

No. 83-1378
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this conclusion, it thought significant the fact that Fla. s.ct.
review was d ~ y .

~

The CA5
prior
timely
ance.

CA5

case,

for

reversed on
held

cert

the

basis of

two cases.

that appointed counsel's

One,

failure

a

to file

in state court constituted ineffective assist-

The other,~uyler v. Sullivan, 446 u.s.

that defendants

who

retain counsel and

335

those

(1980), held

who have counsel

appointed for them enjoy the same right to effective assistance. ~ ~
Together, the CA5 held, these two cases implied a right to effective assistance of retained ~ounsel on discretionary review.

~

tJ~ L }

V

7 b:J:l::-?A.-

Jl4ii s°Cour t teversed summarily and in the process demon/\
~
strated how to analyze this type of claim.
In Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court noted, it had held that a criminal
defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel while
pursuing discretionary state appeals or applying
this Court.

------

for

review in

The Court believed Ross controlled, because "[s]ince

respondent had no constitutional right to counsel, he could not
be deprived of

the effective assistance of counsel by his re-

tained counsel's failure to file the application timely."
wright

v.

Torna,

455 U.S.,

at

587-588

Wain-

(footnote omitted).

In

___________________::,.___~c----

other words, the Court found the source of the right to effective
1

,•

'

I/

assistance not in the ~ight to an ap_e_eal ~
_r _a_t_h_e_r_ 1=
· n=-_
t _h _e _right
•
\\
~ - - - - - - er
,::,
~
to counsel.
T~s, one's right to effective assistance at a par-

=

ticular
appellate level depends not on one's statutory or consti,
tutional

right

to

that

level

of

appeal

but

rather

on

an

indigent's constitutional right to have counsel appointed at that

P~-

L

No. 83-1378
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Applying
straight-forward.
the

vCourt

held

the

Torna

analysis

to

the

present

case

is

In Douglas v. California, 372 u.s. 353 (1963),
that

the

Cons ti tut ion

guaranteed

the

right

to

-

It based this right on both due process

609.

In the present case, since it was his first appeal that his

counsel on first appeal.

and equal protection grounds.

See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 u.s., at

7:;::!:,.
ass ~ ta~e.
The only interesting question is whether this r i g h t ~
~ -?"-*
was violated. Unfortunately, neither party addresses this issue.

counsel

failed

to perfect,

resp did

have

a

right to effective

).p

B: :h just-:ssume that counsel violated such a right if it exists.:Z:::::,

Because the briefs offer no guidance as to standards of effective d2--c.
assistance
on appea 1 ,

t he

·
·
my d'1scuss1on
1s
necessar1·1 y

rest o f

~~
..
~
~

cp

~~

tentative.
Last Term in ~ rickland

~f'

~t-

v.

Washington,

104 s.ct.

2052

~

(1984), this Court determined the standards for ineffective a s - ~

~ ~ i s t a n c e of trial counsel.
~ - obtain a

new trial,

The test has two prongs.

the defendant must show both

counsel's behavior was professionally unreasonable,
2066, and

(ii}

In order to
( i}

that his

id. at 2065-

that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the _result of the proceeding
would have been different,

id.

at 2068.

The Court also recog-

nized, however, that in some limited circumstances, such as actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel, prejudice can
be presumed because

it "is so likely that case by case inquiry

into prejudice is not worth the cost."

Id. at 2067.

To decide this case, it is probably unwise and unnecessary

for

the

Court

to

adopt

any

general

rule

such

as

the

No. 83-1378
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Strickland standard.

Further reflection in the lower courts on

the type of standards best applied to appellate claims would be
helpful, especially since the briefs do not speak to this issue
at all.

Furthermore, a procedural error like the one here would

probably amount to a per se violation under almost any st~ndard.
A court would most likely presume prejudice from any procedural
error

that cuts off the right to an appeal entirely.

Spending

.

time analyzing prejudice in such a situation would serve little
function.

In - most cases,

duplication of effort.

it would lead only to an inefficient

In effect,

the court deciding the inef-

fective assistance claim would have to decide the merits of the
underlying appeal.

In other words,

it would have to decide the

appeal in order to decide whether the state appeals court should
decide it.
In
than

that

practical
involved

~

terms,

this

in Strickland.

is ~ a

~tuS:_h

There,

looking at a well-developed trial record,
whether
given
whether

a
the

particular
overall

trial error

context

of

the

would

d1:,:_fereg t _l.,n quiry ~ -

the appellate court,

have made

case.

It

must

a

difference
decide

shifted the weight of the rest of the case from one verdict to
A court looking at an initial appellate procedural
- - - - -

error, however, is working in a vacuum.

?::::,a

Although it has a trial

record, since the procedural error cut off the appeal entirely,
•
To judge
the court has no appellate context to work from.
whether an appeal would have made a difference, it would, in effeet, have to decide the appeal itself.

---------------------

Of course, a per se rule

~

1--44 l.u"'-'

only ~

a particular error could reasonably be thought to have

the other.

;;::1,-

has to determine only

~

13 t-f r-~-~.:7:;::«~ /4.J

No. 83-1378

~~

~ ~ ~ .. ,.._~ .. ~
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/h.L.~:.~.,e=~

~~

~ ~ a ;1

I

~ .._, ~ · ·

~

1'-1 • ,

should not expend to all appellate ineffective assistance claims.
Such a rule would be most inappropriate when the charge is that
counsel failed

to make an argument well or perhaps at all.

such situations,

In

something like the two-pronged Strickland test

should apply.
Applying

a

per

se

rule here,

moreover,

would pose

no

special danger to a state's enforcement of its appellate rules.
'!he State argues that such rules would be meaningless if a defendant could "cure" an~ default by claiming i neffecti ye assist-

-

ance.
o ne

For one thing, however,
(albeit a powerful)

pellate procedures.
ineffective

a per se rule would remove only

incentive for

-

following the State's ap-

Although a defendant who defaults and claims

assistance

may

get

a

second

crack

at

appeal,

his

counsel runs the risk of bar proceedings and damage to his professional

reputation.

In

this case,

counsel to the Ky. Bar Committee.

in fact,

the DJ reported

/J~l~-1-

~~4-

~J
~

be

z4

~

-~

The threat of these sanctions

would most likely keep a lawyer from abusing ineffective assistance claims.

For another thing, there is little gain to be got-

ten from a procedural default.

A lawyer is unLikely to fail to

follow a state's procedural rules in order to try to obtain

strategic advantage.
Finally,
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F~

there is no merit to the State's claim that a ~

/.Jt>'l)

right to effective appellate counsel poses some special danger to
state court procedures.

The truth

is

that it poses no greater

Both "cure" any procedural default by granting a new hearing or

-

trial.

In the trial context, the courts have recognized that the

,
I ..
1 1 ~ - 1 - n i J c 2 8 / ~ t - ~ ~r'-.. (~, -s~ ~ ~ ~'"'-=,I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
J4.., ~ ~ / 4 - ~ z:-

JI _ j _ . . £ . ~ u ; ~ A ~

No. 83-1378

,_-- , T ~

J.,,,-v

~r

.

~ ~_J ~ ~- L-.dJ
~
~

page 10.

---- . ,., .

4IM..- _

~~
~/-AA-~4--<-4~

----1-~.r))

~~.f..e..-1~
state's

interest

interest

in a

in

fair

proced trral

regularity

trial must both

and

the

defendant's

be accomodated.

A similar

accomodation is no more dangerous--or less necessary--on appeal.

III. Summary.
Under this Court's decision in Torna,

the right to ef-

fective assistance of appellate counsel depends on an indigent's

v. California,

this Court held ~h Jp ~

right to counsel on first ap~ a i~
to
~ Douglas,

overrule either

Torna

(a

onstitution

Thus, unless the

summary reversal)

or

it must find that resp had a right to effective assist-

ance of counsel on his direct appeal in this case.

IV. Recommendation .

aft,~ ..ti.J' W /
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I would recommend affirming the CA6 without laying

--

~

an

general appellate effective assistance standard •

~

;;wn~

Not only

have the parties failed completely to brief this issue, but also
Strickland's

recentness means

courts have not had
apply to appeals.

that

the state and lower

federal

time to consider whether and how it might

Furthermore, an appellate procedural default,

like this one, that cuts off completely the right to appeal would
appear to be a per se violation under almost any test the Court
~

might devise.

•

---......-,,
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............
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Thus, affirming the CA6 without laying down a gen-

eral test would answer the narrow question presented--whether a
right

to

effective

appellate

counsel

exists--,

dispose

of

it
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defendant's
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A similar

accomodation is no more dangerous--or less necessary--on appeal.

III. Summary.
Under

this Court's decision in Torna,

the right to

fective assistance of appellate counsel depends on an indig~
counsel at that particular
v.

California,

this Court held t~J t ~

right to counsel on first ap~~{ !
to
~ Douglas,

overrule

level of app1

either

Torna

(a

onstitu

Thus, unless

summary
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ance of counsel on his direct appeal in this case.
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general appellate effective assistance standard.

Not only

have the parties failed completely to brief this issue, but also
Strickland's
courts

have

recentness
not had

apply to appeals.

means

time

that

the state and

to consider whether

lower

federal

and how it might

Furthermore, an appellate procedural default,

like this one, that cuts off completely the right to appeal would
appear to be a per se violation under almost any test the Court
might , devise.

Thus, affirming the CA6 without laying down a gen-

eral test would answer the narrow question presented--whether a
right

to

effective

appellate

counsel

exists--,

dispose

of

it
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and leave for

that right.
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another day the question of what violates
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The
relevant

following

are

miscellaneous

to consideration of

notes possibly
See Dan's

the above case.

bench memo, and my preliminary memo to file.
Ross

v.

Moffitt,

417

u.s.

600,

held

that

a

criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to
counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals.
In
decision

Wainwright

reversing

v.

CA5) ,

Torna,
the

u.s.

455

Florida

:;;-J77
JU

Supreme

(a

Court

PC
had

dismissed an appeal on the ground that the application was
not

filed

petition
his

for

right

failure

habeas,
to

of

appellate

-

The

timely.

convicted

contending

effective

his

rules.

counsel
In

filed

a

§2254

that he had been denied

assistance

retained

court's

felon

of
to

Florida

counsel
comply
at

that

by

the

with

the

time

an

appeal was purely discretionary, and therefore under Ross
v.

Moffitt

right

the

er iminal

to counsel

defendant

had

no constitutional

to pursue an appeal.

In Wainwright we

4ud

therefore hGM:
"Since respondent had no constitutional right to
counsel,
he could not be deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel by retained
counsel's
failure
to
file
the
application
timely."

And in footnote in the PC opinion, we said:
"Respondent was not denied due process of law by
the fact that counsel deprived him of his right
to petition the Florida Supreme Court for
review.
Such deprivation - even if implicating
a due process interest - was c ~
is
counsel, and not by the state.
The action of
~
Florida Supreme Court in dismissing an
application for review that was not filed timely
did not deprive respondent of due process of
law." 455 u.s., at 588, n. 4.

* * *
In this case, where Kentucky provided a right of
appeal,

apparently

"ht
t h ere/\~~~~
a const1 tut1ona l r 19

to

counsel derived from the Equal Protection Clause {®C S it
ma-ke d".li}' J i ffetEnL ~at~ n this case it is stipulated that

there

was

appeal

no denial of equal protection?)

was

dismissed

by

the

Kentukcy

Respondent's

Court

of

Appeals

because retained counsel failed in his petition to include
certain

formal

information

The Court of Appeals held
provide
respondent

effective
was

reinstated ~

Kentucky

Rules.

se failure

the

appeal

to

that

therefore

and

eithe rWfor

to

be

On the one hand,

it

ven ; : ;w trial.

case is troublesome.
unfair

by

this was a V-:e r

assistance,

entitled
e ~

required

when an appeal of

right exists,

that right is frustrated by an error of counsel.

if

A right

to

sue

counsel

defendant would
conviction.
interest

often
have

would

be

unproductive,

and

the

lost an opportunity to reverse his

On the other hand, a state has a substantial

in enforcing

its own appeallate rules,

and

the

penalty on the state of reinstating the appeal or granting
a new trial is not an insubstantial one.
Of course, as Dan's memo points out,
been no

finding

in

this case of

there has

ineffective assistance.

Yet, counsel surely is ineffective if he fails to comply
with the Rules, and apparently excuses are not acceptable
because of the possible injustice to the convicted client.
We

know here

how

frequently

requests

for

extensions

of

time are filed because of illness, demands of other work,
presence of a new counsel, etc.
In terns of fairness,
has

only

a

discretionary

!tr~~~-~
T

~ ~ ~· ~ I - { I r - ..: ~
a convicted defendant wh~

right

to

appeal

may

well

be ~

injured as seriously by failure of counsel to perfect the
appeal

as

the

defendant

who

because of counsel's negligence.

loses

a

right

to

Yet, as the footnote in

Torna states, where the appeal is discretionary ~
is no constitutional right to counsel
The

deprivation

state".

is

"caused

by

appeal

there

(Ross v. Moffitt).

counsel

and

not

by

the

I must say that this is a good deal less than a

...
~

satisfactory reason/ (s uch an important difference:

in one

case the convicted defendant gets a new trial and in the
other case he does not.

In a rational system of justice,

one would think there should not be this disparate result.
Possibly

the distinction between a discretionary and an

absolute right of appeal is an unsound one, and that Ross
v. Moffitt should be reconsidered.
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83-1378 Kavanaugh v. Lucey
Rights on Appeal:
Griffin
Protection

v.

Clause

Illinois,

351

requires

U.S.

that

12.

where

The

an

Equal

indigent

defendant has a right of appeal he be given a transcript
of the trial record.

Douglas v.

California,

372 U.S.

353.

Involves

the right of an indigent to appointed counsel on a first
appeal where the state grants the right to such an appeal.
The first appeal in California was to a District Court of
Appeal,

and

Douglas'

Following Griff in,
Court

held

that

request

for

counsel

was

denied.

and on equal protection grounds,

where

the

"first

appeal,

granted

this
as

a

matter of right to rich and poor alike, an indigent must
be provided counsel."

Ross
there

is

no

v.

Moffitt,

417

constitutional

U.S.

right

600.
to

an

We

held

that

appeal,

and

therefore when an appeal is discretionary only there is no
right to appointed counsel or to the effective assistance
of

counsel.

My

understanding

of

Moffitt

is

that

it

applies to any discretionary appeal -

whether a first or

second appeal.

Wainwright

v.

Torna,

455

u.s.

586.

In a

Per

Curiam by John Stevens, where retained counsel had failed
to file appeal on time we held there was no denial of a
constitutional

right

as

appeal

was

only

discretionary.

The deprivation resulted from private action (the neglect
of

counsel);

right.

not

from

deprivation

of

a

constitutional
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CHAMl!ll!:RS 01'

JUSTICE

w... J ,

BRENNAN, JR.

October 12, 1984

No. 83-1378
Kavanaugh v. Lucey

Dear Chief,
I'll try my hand at an opinion for
the Court in the above case.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

"'funrt ur Uft ~~D ~tatt
-.rzul!pttghm. ~- OJ. 20ffe)!,

;e,u.p:rtttt.f

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

October 1 , 1984
Re:

No. 83-1378

Kavanaugh v. Lucey

Dear Chief,
I would be happy to take on the dissent in this case.

r

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

u r r 11...,c:.. u r

Inc:.. 1...,L..c:..H'r.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON,

D. C.

20543

October 25, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Paul Kavanaugh, Superintendent,
Blackburn Correctional Complex and
David L. Armstrong v. Keith E. Lucey
No. 83-1378

When the above case was argued before you on
October 10, 1984, counsel for respondent Lucey was
requested to submit a letter indicating whether his
client wished to continue with his case.
Attached is a copy of the letter which I
received from counsel for Mr. Lucey.
Respectfully submitted,

Alexander L. Stevas
Clerk

Attachment

OCT 2 5 1984
WALKER & RADIGAN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

I

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

SUITE 303, LEGAL ARTS BUILDING
200 SOUTH SEVENTH STREET, LOUISVILLE, KY , 40202
(5021 583-7713

WILLIAM M. RADIGAN
PATRICIA G . WALKER

October 22, 1984

Mr. Alexander L. Stevas, Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.
20543
RE: Kavanaugh and Armstrong v. Lucey, No. 83-1378
Dear Mr. Stevas:
During the oral argument in the above-captioned case on
October 10, 1984, Chief Justice Burger raised the issue of
mootness inasmuch as Mr. Lucey had been released from parole and
had had his civil rights restored. The Chief Justice
specifically requested that I contact Mr. Lucey to find out
whether he still wishes to continue his case.
I wrote to Mr. Lucey upon my return to Louisville on
Thursday, October 11, 1984. Today I finally received Mr. Lucey's
response.
Mr. Lucey unequivocally wishes to continue with his case. He
believes that he has valid claims on his appeal of his
conviction, and wishes, as he has since 1978, to have his direct
appeal to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reinstated, if
possible. Consequently, Mr. Lucey would like to complete his
present case before this Court.
I hope that this will prove to be sufficient.
If there are
any questions on this matter, please feel free to contact me.

s5;;:~
William M. Radigan
WMR:klm

cc: Mr. Gerald Henry

•uprmu (!Jiturl .rf tlf.t ~t.tb •mt.ts
'Jl'u1fitqlhm. ~- QJ. 2'.llffe'l;l
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 29, 1984

Re:

83-1378 - Kavanaugh v. Lucey

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.'

.:t'ltpt'tntt

'4-0lU"t OT Uft ~ t D :L'IltUS

-as1pngtcn. ~- <4, 2llffe~,

V

CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 29, 1984
Re:

No.83-1378

Kavanaugh v. Lucey

Dear Bill,
In due course I will circulate a dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

.tiqrrtntt ~DUrt of l4t Juittb ~tatt~
Jliudrhtgton, !}. ~. 2llffe~,
CHAMBER S OF

JUS T ICE SANORA DAY O ' CONNOR

November 29, 1984

Re: No. 83-1378

Kavanaugh v. Lucey

Dear Bill:
I am generally content with the analysis of your
draft opinion and I agree with its conclusion.
I do,
however, ~ v.
wo concerns with the draft as currently
written.
irst the second complete sentence on page 8, if
taken out
c ontext, might suggest a right to effective
assistance of counsel in judicial proceedings in general.
I
am troubled by such a suggestion, and I would prefer that
the sentence be deleted.
My second, .a~ more general, concern is that part
I. C. of the draft g~~ too little attention to the
distinction drawn by Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974),
between appeals as of right and discretionary appeals.
It
would be desirable, in my view, to acknowledge our holding
in Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (per curiam),
that there is no right to counsel, and therefore no right to
effective assistance of counsel, for ~ cr ~ iona~~ ape eals.
Some discussion on this point would, I believe,
1t
logically into the analysis of the right to effective
assistance for a first appeal as of right that appears at
pages 8 and 9 of the draft.

M

If you could accommodate my concerns in this
regard, I would be happy to join your opinion.
Sincerely

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
'

dro 11/30/84

MEMORANDUM

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From: Dan
IE:

JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion in Kavanaugh v.

Lucey,

No.

83-

1378.

JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion is very well reasoned and well
I have only a few comments.

written.

TICE O'CONNOR'S two suggestions:

First, I agree with JUS-

(i) dropping the second complete

sentence on page 8 or at least making it clear that the term "judicial proceedings"

is

used

in a

quite

limited

sense and

(ii)

tying together some of the analysis through Wainwright v. Torna.
Second,

if

I

remember

correctly,

you were

troubled by finding

ineffective assistance in the context of a jurisdictional bar to
appeal.

JUSTICE BRENNAN'S present opinion makes clear that the

default here is non-jurisdictional, but nothing in the reasoning
of the opinion limits the holding to this situation.

Thus, lower

courts will probably apply the holding to jurisdictional defaults
too.
be

I am still not convinced that ineffective assistance should

analyzed

faults.

differently

in

the

context

of

jurisdictional

de-

But if you still feel strongly that it should be, you

cou1d ask JUSTICE BRENNAN to make clear that the holding extends

only to non-jurisdictional defaults.

Such a course would leave

the case of jurisdictional defaults to another day.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Brennan

Circulated: _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1378

PAUL KAVANAUGH, SUPERINTENDENT, BLACKBURN CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX AND DAVID
L. ARMSTRONG, ATTORNEY GENERAL ,
PETITIONERS v. KEITH E. LUCEY

--

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
.,-

-

[December -

, 1984]

,l.fuSTICE BRENNAN dj livered the opinion of the Court.
~ ouglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), held that the
Fourteenth .Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to counsel on his first appeal as of right. In this case,
we must decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the criminal defendant the
effective assistance of counsel on such an appeal.

I
On March 21, 1976, a Kentucky jury found respondent
guilty of trafficking in controlled substances. His retained
counsel filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky, the state intermediate appellate court. Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure 1.095(a)(l) requires appellants to serve on the appellate court the record on appeal and
a "Statement of Appeal" that is to contain the names of appellants and appellees, counsel, and the trial judge, the date of
judgment, the date of notice of appeal, and additional in- •
formation. 1 See England v. Spalding, 460 S. W. 2d 4, 6
1

--;1 _

I IA' ~

~

/

Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure 1.090 provided:
"In all cases the appellant shall file with the record on appeal a statement
setting forth : (a) The name of each appellant and each appellee .. . (b) The
name and address of counsel for each appellant and each appellee. (c) The

f <)<'4.-k> :r;u:;t:c. e [) I Ct, ~ "'~,. 's ~ (,, 't"5 l;·e-. 5
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(Ky. 1970) (rule "is designed to assist this court in processing
records and is not jurisdictional"). Respondent's counsel
failed to file a Statement of Appeal when he filed his brief and
the record on appeal on September 12, 1977. 2
When the State filed its brief, it included a motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to file a Statement of Appeal.
The Court of Appeals granted this motion because "appellant
has failed to supply the information required by RAP
1.095(a)(l)." J. A. 37a. Respondent moved for reconsideration, arguing that all of the information necessary for a
statement of appeal was in fact included in his brief, albeit in
a somewhat different format. At the same time, respondent
tendered a Statement of Appeal that formally complied with
the State rules. The Court of Appeals summarily denied the
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner sought discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of Kentucky, but the judgment
of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in a one-sentence order.
In a final effort to gain State appellate review of his conviction, respondent moved the trial court to vacate the judgname and address of the trial judge. (d) The date the judgment appealed
from was entered, and the page of the record on appeal on which it may be
found .... (e) The date the notice of appeal was filed and the page of the
record on appeal on which it may be found. (f) Such of the following facts,
if any, as are true: (1) a notice of cross appeal has been filed; (2) a supersedeas bond has been executed; (3) any reason the appeal should be advanced; (4) this is a suit involving multiple claims and judgment has been
made final ... ; (5) there is another appeal pending in a case which involves
the same transaction or occurrence, or a common question of law or fact,
with which this appeal should be consolidated, giving the style of the other
case; (6) the appellant is free on bond."
2
The argument headings on the appellate brief were: "I. Was it error to
admit photographs of the appellant into evidence which lacked any probative value and served only to mislead and to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury? II. Did the charge to the jury meet the requirements of
the due process of law? III. Was the appellant denied his constitutional
right to a fair trial by improper conduct during the trial and by prejudicial
comments made by the prosecutor during his summation?" Joint Appendix, at 7a-8a. The merits of none of these claims are before us.

83-137~OPINION
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3

mentor to grant a.belated appeal. The trial court denied the
motion.
Respondent then sought federal habeas corpus relief in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. He challenged the constitutionality of the State's dismissal of his appeal because of his lawyer's failure to file the
Statement of Appeal, on the ground that the dismissal deprived him of his right to effective assistance of counsel on
appeal guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
District Court granted respondent a conditional writ of habeas corpus ordering his release unless the State either reinstated his appeal or retried him. 3 The State appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reached no decision on the merits but instead remanded the case to the District Court for determination whether respondent had a claim
under the Equal Protection Clause.
On remand, counsel for both parties stipulated that there
was no equal protection issue in the case, the only issue being
whether the State's action in dismissing respondent's appeal
violated the Due Process Clause. The District Court thereupon reissued the conditional writ of habeas corpus. On January 12, 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. We granted the
State's petition for certiorari. - - U. S. - - (1984). We
affirm. 4
3
The district court also referred petitioner's counsel to the Board of
Governors of the Kentucky State Bar Association for disciplinary proceedings for "attacking his own work product." See J. A. 44a. Petitioner is
not represented by the same counsel before this Court.
' The State informed this Court five days prior to oral argument that
respondent had been finally released from custody and his civil rights, including suffrage and the right to hold public office, restored as of May 10,
1983. However, respondent has not been pardoned and some collateral
consequences of his conviction remain, including the possibility that the
conviction would be used to impeach testimony he might give in a future
proceeding and the possibility that it would be used to subject him to
persistent felony offender prosecution if h~ should go to trial on any other

'

I
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II
Respondent has for the past seven years unsuccessfully
pursued every avenue open to him in an effort to obtain a decision on the merits of his appeal and to prove that his conviction was unlawful. The Kentucky appellate courts' refusal to
hear him on the merits of his claim does not stem from any
view of those merits, and respondent does not argue in this
Court that the State was constitutionally required to render
judgment on the appeal in his favor. Rather the issue we
must decide is whether the State's dismissal of the appeal,
despite the ineffective assistance of respondent's counsel on
appeal, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Before analyzing the merits of respondent's contention, it
is appropriate to emphasize two limits on the scope of the
question presented. First, there is no challenge to the District Court's finding that respondent indeed received ineffective assistance· of counsel on appeal. Respondent allegesand the State does not deny in this Court-that his counsel's
failure to obey a simple court rule that could have such drastic consequences required this finding. We therefore need
not decide the content of appropriate standards for judging
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Cf.
Strickland v. Washington, - - U. S. - - (1984); United
States v. Cronic, - - U. S. - - (1984). Second, the stipulation in the District Court on remand limits our inquiry
solely to the validity of the State's action under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
Respondent's claim arises at the intersection of two lines of
cases. In one line, we have held that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a criminal appellant pursuing a first
felony charges in the future. This case is thus not moot. See Cara/as v.
LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234, 238 (1968); Sibron v. United States, 392 U. S. 40,
55-57 (1968).
5
Seemingly, respondent entered the stipulation because his attorney on
appeal had been retained, not appointed.
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appeal as of right certain minimum safeguards necessary to
make that appeal "adequate and effective," see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 20 (1956); among those safeguards are the
right to counsel, see Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353
(1961). In the second line, we have held that the trial-level
right to counsel, created by the Sixth Amendment and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344 (1963), comprehends the right to effective assistance of counsel. See
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 344 (1980). The question
presented in this case is whether the appellate-level right to
counsel also comprehends the right to effective assistance of
counsel.
A

Almost a century ago, the Court held that the Constitution
does not require States to grant appeals as of right to criminal defendants seeking to review alleged trial court errors.
M cKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684 (1894). Nonetheless, if a
State has created appellate courts as "an integral part of the
... system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a
defendant," Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion), the procedures used in deciding appeals must
comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. In Griffin itself, a transcript of the trial court proceedings was a prerequisite to a
decision on the merits of an appeal. See id., at 13-14. We
held that the State must provide such a transcript to indigent
criminal appellants who could not afford to buy one if that
was the only way to assure an "adequate and effective" appeal. Id., at 20; see also Eskridge v. Washington State
Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U. S. 214, 215
(1958) (per curiam) (invalidating state rule giving free transcripts only to defendants who could convince trial judge that
"justice will thereby be promoted"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S.
252 (1959) (invalidating state requirement that indigent defendants pay fee before filing notice of appeal of conviction);
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Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 (1963) (invalidating procedure
whereby meaningful appeal was possible only if public defender requested a transcript); Draper v. Washington, 372
U. S. 487 (1963) (invalidating state procedure providing for
free transcript only for a defendant who could satisfy the trial
judge that his appeal was not frivolous).
Just as a transcript may by rule or custom be a prerequisite to appellate review, the services of a lawyer will for
virtually every layman be necessary to present an appeal in a
form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits. See
Griffin, 351 U. S., at 20. Therefore, Douglas v. California,
supra, recognized that the principles of Griffin required a
State that afforded a right of appeal to make that appeal
more than a "meaningless ritual" by supplying an indigent
appellant in a criminal case with an attorney. 372 U. S., at
358. This right to counsel is limited to the first appeal as of
right, see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), and the attorney need not advance every argument, regardless of merit,
urged by the appellant, see Jones v. Barnes, - - U. S. - (1983). But the attorney must be available to assist in preparing and submitting a brief to the appellate court, Swenson
v. Bosler, 386 U. S. 258 (1967) (per curiam) and must play
the role of an active advocate, rather than a mere friend of
the court assisting in a detached evaluation of the appellant's
claim. See Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967); see
also Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U. S. 748 (1967).

B
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was "so fundamental and
essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process oflaw, that it is
made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 340, quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455,
465 (1942); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). Gideon rested on
the "obvious truth" that lawyers are "necessities, not luxu-
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ries" in our adversarial system of criminal justice. Id., at
344. "The very premise of our adversary system of criminal
justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." Herring v. New York, 422
U. S. 853, 862 (1975). The defendant's liberty depends on
his ability to present his case in the face of "the intricacies of
the law and the advocacy of the prosecutor," United States v.
Ash, 413 U. S. 300, 309 (1973); a criminal trial is thus not conducted in accord with due process of law unless the defendant
has counsel to represent him. 6
As we have made clear, the guarantee of counsel "cannot
be satisfied by mere formal appointment," Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1940). "That a person who happens to
be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command.
An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney,
whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary
to ensure that the trial is fair." Strickland v. Washington,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1984); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970) ("It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective asOur cases dealing with the right to counsel-whether at trial or on appeal-have often focused on the defendant's need for an attorney to meet
the adversary presentation of the prosecutor. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 358 (1963) (noting the benefit of "counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on
[client's] behald"). Such cases emphasize the defendant's need for counsel
in order to obtain a favorable decision. The facts of this case emphasize a
different, albeit related, aspect of counsel's role, that of expert professional
whose assistance is necessary in a legal system governed by complex rules
and procedures for the defendant to obtain a decision at all-much less a
favorable decision-on the merits of the case. In a situation like that here,
counsel's failure was particularly egregious in that it essentially waived
respondent's opportunity to make a case on the merits; in this sense, it is
difficult to distinguish respondent's situation from that of someone who had
no counsel at all. Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967);
Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U. S. 748 (1967).
6
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sistance of counsel."); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 344
(1980). Last Term, we emphasized this point while clarifying the standards to be used in assessing claims that trial
counsel failed to provide effective representation. See
United States v. Cronic, - - U. S. - - (1984); Strickland
v. Washington, supra. Because the right to counsel is so
fundamental to a fair trial, the Constitution can not tolerate
trials in which counsel, though present in name, is unable to
assist the defendant to obtain a fair decision on the merits.
As the quotation from Strickland, supra, makes clear, the
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel at
trial applies to every criminal prosecution, without regard to
whether counsel is retained or appointed. See Cuyler v.
Sullivan, supra, at 342-345. The Constitutional mandate is
addressed to the action of the State in obtaining a criminal
conviction through a procedure that fails to meet the standards of due process of law. "Unless a defendant charged
with a serious offense has counsel able to invoke the procedural and substantive safeguards that distinguish our system
of justice, a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself.
When a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a
trial, it is the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty." Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 343
(citations omitted).
C
The two lines of cases mentioned-the cases recognizing
the right to counsel on a first appeal as of right and the cases
recognizing that the right to counsel at trial includes a right
to effective assistance of counsel-are dispositive of respondent's claim. In bringing an appeal as of right from his conviction, a criminal defendant is attempting to demonstrate
that the conviction, and the consequent drastic loss of liberty,
is unlawful. To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant
must face an adversary proceeding that-like a trial-is governed by intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented appellant-like an un-
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represented defendant at trial-is unable to protect the vital
interests at stake. To be sure, respondent did have nominal
representation when he brought this appeal. But nominal
representation on an appeal as of right-like nominal representation at trial-does not suffice to render the proceedings
constitutionally adequate; a party whose counsel is unable to
provide effective representation is in no better position than
one who has no counsel at all.
A first appeal as of right therefore is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have
the effective assistance of an attorney. 7 This result is
hardly novel. The petitioners in both Anders v. California,
386 U. S. 738 (1967), and Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U. S. 748
(1967), claimed that, although represented in name by counsel, they had not received the type of assistance constitutionally required to render the appellate proceedings fair. In
both cases, we agreed with the petitioners, holding that
counsel's failure in Anders to submit a brief on appeal and
counsel's waiver.in Entsminger of the petitioner's right to a
full transcript rendered the subsequent judgments against
the petitioners unconstitutional. 8 In short, the promise of
Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel on
appeal7 l1ke the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
1
A½ws v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), held, the considerations governing a discretionary appeal are somewhat different. See infra p. - -.
Of course, the right to effective assistance of counsel is dependent on the
right to counsel itself. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U. S. 586, 587-588
(1982) (per curiam) ("Since respondent had no constitutional right to counsel, he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his
retained counsel's failure to file the appeal timely.") (footnote omitted).
8
Moreover, Jones v. Barnes, - - U.S. - - (1983), adjudicated a similar claim "of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel." Id ., at - -. In
Jones, the appellate attorney had failed to raise every issue requested by
the criminal defendant. This Court rejected the claim, not because there
was no right to effective assistance of appellate counsel, but because counsel's conduct in fact served the goal of "vigorous and effective advocacy."
Id. , at--. The Court's reasoning would have been entirely superfluous
if there were no right to effective assistance of counsel in the first place.
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has a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.
Recognition of the right to effective assistance of counsel
on appeal requires that we affirm the Sixth Circuit's decision
in this case. The State objects that this holding will disable
state courts from enforcing a wide range of vital procedural
rules governing appeals. Counsel may, according to the
State, disobey such rules with impunity if the state courts are
precluded from enforcing them by dismissing the appeal.
The State's concerns are exaggerated. The lower federal
courts-and many state courts-overwhelmingly have recognized a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 9

I

9
See, e. g., Francois v. Wainwright, 741 F. 2d 1275, 1284-1285 (CAll
1984); Tsirizotakis v. Lefevre, 736 F . 2d 57, 65 (CA2), cert. denied, - U. S. (1984); Branch v. Cupp, 736 F . 2d 533, 537-538 (CA9 1984);
Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F. 2d 1282, 1291 (CAll), cert. denied, - U. S. - - (1984); Cunningham v. Henderson, 725 F. 2d 32 (CA2 1984);
Doyle v. United States, 721 F. 2d 1195 (CA9 1983); Gilbert v. Sowders, 646
F. 2d 1146 (CA6 1981) (per curiam) (dismissal of appeal because retained
counsel ran afoul of "highly technical procedural rule" violated due
process); Perez v. Wainwright, 640 F . 2d 596, 598 n. 3 (CA5 1981) (citing
cases), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 910 (1982); Robinson v. Wyrick, 635 F. 2d
757 (CA8 1981); Cleaver v. Bordenkircher, 634 F. 2d 1010 (CA6), cert. denied sub nom. Sowders v. Cleaver, 451 U. S. 1008 (1981); Miller v. McCarthy, 607 F. 2d 854, 857-858 (CA91979); Passmore v. Estelle, 594 F. 2d 115
(CA5 1979), cert. denied , 446 U. S. 937 (1980); Cantrell v. State, 546 F . 2d
652, 653 (CA5), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 959 (1977); Walters v. Harris, 460
F. 2d 988, 990 (CA4 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Wren v. United States,
409 U. S. 1129 (1973); Macon v. Lash, 458 F . 2d 942, 949-950 (CA7 1972);
Hill v. Page, 454 F . 2d 679 (CAl0 1971) (performance of retained counsel
on appeal to be judged by standards of Anders and Entsminger); Blanchard v. Brewer, 429 F. 2d 89 (CA8 1970) (dismissal of appeal when retained counsel failed to serve papers properly held violation of due process); see also Harkness v. State, 264 Ark. 561, 572 S. W. 2d 835 (1978) (per
curiam); People v. Barton, 21 Cal. 3d 513, 579 P. 2d 1043 (1978); Erb v.
State, 332 A. 2d 137 (Del. 1974); Hines v. United States, 237 A. 2d 827
(D. C. App. 1968); Barclay v. Wainwright, 444 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1984);
McAuliffe v. Rutledge, 231 Ga. 745, 204 S. E. 2d 141 (1974); State v. Er-
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These decisions do not seem to have had dire consequences
for the States' ability to conduct appeals in accordance with
reasonable procedural rules. Nor for that matter has the
longstanding recognition of a right to effective assistance of
counsel at trial-including the recognition in Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, that this right extended to retained as well as appointed counsel-rendered ineffectual the perhaps more complex procedural rules governing the conduct of trials. See
also United States v. Cronic, supra; Strickland v. Washington, supra.
To the extent that a State believes its procedural rules are
in jeopardy, numerous courses remain open. For example, a
State may certainly enforce a vital procedural rule by imposing sanctions against the attorney, rather than against the
client. Such a course may well be more effective than the
alternative of refusing to decide the merits of an appeal and
will reduce the possibility that a defendant who was powerless to obey the rules will serve a term of years in jail on an
unlawful conviction. If instead a State chooses to dismiss an
appeal when an incompetent attorney has violated local rules,
it may do so if such action does not intrude upon the client's
due process rights. For instance the State of Kentucky itself in other contexts has permitted a postconviction attack
on the trial judgment as "the appropriate remedy for frustrated right of appeal," Hammershoy v. Commonwealth, 398
S. W. 2d 883 (Ky. 1966); this is but one of several solutions
'Win, 57 Ha. 268, 554 P. 2d 236 (1976); People v. Brown, 39 Ill. 2d 307, 235
N. E . 2d 562 (1968); Burton v. State, Ind. - , 455 N. E. 2d 938
(1983); Wilson v. State, 284 Md. 664, 669-671, 399 A. 2d 256, 258-260
(1979); Irving v. State, 441 So. 2d 846, 856 (Miss. 1983); People v. Gonzalez, 47 N. Y. 2d 606, 393 N. E. 2d 987 (1979); Shipman v. Gladden, 253
Or. 192, 453 P. 2d 921 (1969); Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296,
416 A. 2d 477 (1980); Grooms v. State, 320 N. W. 2d 149 (SD 1982); In re
Savo, 139 Vt. 527, 431 A. 2d 482 (1981); Rhodes v. Leverette, 160 W. Va.
781, 239 S. E. 2d 136 (1977). These cases diverge widely in the standards
used to judge ineffectiveness, the remedy ordered, and the rationale used.
We express no opinion as to the merits of any of these decisions.
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that state and federal courts have permitted in similar
cases. 10 A system of appeal as of right is established precisely to assure that only those who are validly convicted
have their freedom drastically curtailed. A State may not
extinguish this right because another right of the appellantthe right to effective assistance of counsel-has been
violated.
III
The State urges that our reasoning rests on faulty
premises. First, the State argues that because the State
need not establish a system of appeals as of right in the first
instance, the State is immune from all constitutional scrutiny
when it chooses to have such a system. Second, the State
denies that respondent had the right to counsel on his appeal
to the Kentucky Court of Appeals because such an appeal
was a "conditional appeal," rather than an appeal as of right.
Third, the State argues that, even if its actions here are subject to constitutional scrutiny and even if the appeal sought
here was an appeal as of right, the Due Process Clauseupon which respondent's claimed right to effective assistance
of counsel is based-has no bearing on the State's actions in
this case. We take up each of these three arguments in turn.
A

In support of its first argument, the State initially relies on
M cKane v. Durston, supra, which held that a State need not
provide a system of appellate review as of right at all. See
also Ross v. Moffitt, supra, at--; Jones v. Barnes, supra,
10
In Stahl v. Commonwealth, 613 S. W. 2d 617 (Ky. 1981), the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that, if on post-conviction motion the defendant could prove that counsel was ineffective on appeal, "the proper procedure is for the trial court to vacate the judgment and enter a new one,
whereupon an appeal may be taken from the new judgment." Id ., at 618.
See also Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U. S. 327, 332 (1969) (ordering
similar remedy for denial of appeal in federal prosecution); United States v.
Winterhalder, 724 F . 2d 109 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (discussing
remedies).
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at - - . The State derives from this proposition the much
broader principle that "whatever a state does or does not do
on appeal-whether or not to have an appeal and if so, how to
operate it-is of no due process concern to the Constitution
.... " Brief for Petitioner, at 23. It would follow that the
State's action in cutting off respondent's appeal because of his
attorney's incompetence would oe permissible under the Due
Process Clause.
This argument need not detain us long. The right to appeal would be unique among state actions if it could be withdrawn without consideration of applicable due process norms.
For instance, although a State may choose whether it will institute any given welfare program, it must operate whatever
programs it does establish subject to the protections of the
Due Process Clause. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254,
262 (1970). Similarly, a State has great discretion in setting
policies governing parole decisions, but it must nonetheless
make those decisions in accord with the Due Process Clause.
See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481-484 (1972). See
also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U. S. 398, 404 (1963); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 165-166 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). In short, when a state opts to act in a field
where its action has significant discretionary elements, it
must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process
Clause.
B
The State's second argument relies on the holding of Ross
v. M ofjitt, supra, that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel only on appeals as of right, not on discretionary state
appeals. According to the State, the Kentucky courts permit criminal appeals only on condition that the appellant follow the State rules and statutes governing such appeals.
See Brown v. Commonwealth, 551 S. W. 2d 557, 559 (1977).
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Therefore, the system does not establish an appeal as of
right, but only a "conditional appeal" subject to dismissal if
the state rules are violated. The State concludes that if respondent has no appeal as of right, he has no right to counsel-or to effective assistance of counsel-on his "conditional
appeal."
Under any reasonable interpretation of the line drawn in
Ross between discretionary appeals and appeals as of right, a
criminal defendant's appeal of a conviction to the Kentucky
Court of Appeals is an appeal as of right. Section 115 of the
Kentucky Constitution provides that "[i]n all cases, civil and .
criminal, there shall be allowed as a matter of right at least
one appeal to another court." Unlike the appellant in the
discretionary appeal in Ross, a criminal appellant in the Kentucky Court of Appeals typically has not had the benefit of a
previously prepared trial transcript, a brief on the merits of
the appeal, or a previous written opinion. See Ross, supra,
at 615. In addition, the State fails to point to any source of
Kentucky law indicating that a decision on the merits in an
appeal like that of respondent-unlike the discretionary appeal in Ross-is contingent on a discretionary finding by the
Court of Appeal.s that the case involves significant public or
jurisprudential issues; the purpose of a first appeal in the
Kentucky court system appears to be precisely to determine
whether the individual defendant has been lawfully convicted. In short, a criminal defendant bringing an appeal to
the Kentucky Court of Appeals has not previously had "an
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process." See id., at 616. It
follows that for purposes of analysis under the Due Process
Clause, respondent's appeal was an appeal as of right, thus
triggering the right to counsel recognized in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963).
C

Finally, the State argues that even if the Due Process
Clause does apply to the manner in which a State conducts its
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system of appeals and even if the appeal denied to respondent
was an appeal as of right, the Due Process Clause nonetheless is not offended by the State's refusal to decide respondent's appeal on the merits, because that Clause has no role to
play in granting a criminal appellant the right to counsel-or
a fortiori to the effective assistance of counsel-on appeal.
Although it may seem that Douglas and its progeny defeat
this argument, the State attempts to distinguish these cases
by exploiting a seeming ambiguity in our previous decisions.
According to the State, the constitutional requirements
recognized in Griffin, Douglas, and the cases that followed
had their source in the Equal Protection Clause, and not the
Due Process Clause, of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
support of this contention, the State points out that all of the
cases in the Griffin line have involved claims by indigent defendants that they have the same right to a decision on the
merits of their appeal as do wealthier defendants who are
able to afford lawyers, transcripts, or the other prerequisites
of a fair adjudication on the merits. As such, the State
claims, the cases all should be understood as equal protection
cases challenging the constitutional validity of the distinction
made between rich and poor criminal defendants. The State
concludes that if the Due Process Clause permits criminal appeals as of right to be forfeited because the appellant has no
transcript or no attorney, it surely permits such appeals to be
forfeited when the appellant has an attorney who is unable to
assist in prosecuting the appeal.
The State's argument rests on a misunderstanding of the
diverse sources of our holdings in this area. In Ross v. M offitt, supra, at 608-609, we held that "[t]he precise rationale
for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some
from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment." Accord
Bearden v. Georgia, - - U. S. - -, - - (1983) ("Due proc-
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ess and equal protection principles converge in the Court's
analysis in these cases.") See also Note, The Supreme
Court, 1962 Term, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 107, n. 13 (1963) (citing cases). This rather clear statement in Ross that the Due
Process Clause played a significant role in prior decisions is
well supported by the cases themselves.
In Griffin, for instance, the State had in effect dismissed
petitioner's appeal because he could not afford a transcript.
In establishing a system of appeal as of right, the State had
implicitly determined that it was unwilling to curtail drastically a defendant's liberty unless ·a second judicial decisionmaker, the appellate court, was convinced that the conviction
was in accord with law. But having decided that this determination was so important-having made the appeal the final
step in the adjudication of guilt or innocence of the individual,
see Griffin, supra, at 18---the State could not in effect make
it available only to the wealthy. Such a disposition violated
equal protection principles because it distinguished between
poor and rich with respect to such a vital right. But it also
violated due process principles because it decided the appeal
in a way that was arbitrary with respect to the issues involved. In Griffin, we noted that a court dispensing "justice" at the trial level by charging the defendant for the privilege of pleading not guilty "would make the constitutional
promise of a fair trial a worthless thing." Id., at 17. Deciding an appeal on the same basis would have the same obvious-and constitutionally fatal-defect. See also Douglas,
supra, at 357 (procedure whereby indigent defendant must
demonstrate merit of case before obtaining counsel on appeal
"does not comport with fair procedure"); Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738, 744 (1967) ("constitutional requirement of
substantial equality and fair process can only be attained
where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate") (emphasis added).
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Our decisions in Anders, Entsminger v. Iowa, supra, and
Jones v. Barnes, supra, are all inconsistent with the State's
interpretation. As noted above, all of these cases dealt with
the responsibilities of an attorney representing an indigent
criminal defendant on appeal. 11 Although the Court reached
a different result in Jones from that reached in Anders and
Entsminger, all of these cases rest on the premise that the
State must supply indigent criminal appellants with attorneys who can provide specified types of assistance--that is,
that such appellants have a right to effective assistance of
counsel. The State claims that all such rights enjoyed by
criminal appellants have their source in the Equal Protection
Clause, and that such rights are all measured by the rights of
nonindigent appellants. But if the State's argument in the
instant case is correct, nonindigent appellants themselves
have no right to effective assistance of counsel. It would follow that indigent appellants also have no right to effective
assistance of counsel, and all three of these cases erred in
reaching the contrary conclusion.
The lesson of our cases, as we pointed out in Ross, supra,
at 609, is that each Clause triggers a distinct inquiry: "'Due
Process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated. 'Equal Protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment
by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are
arguably indistinguishable." 12 In cases like Griffin and
Douglas, due process concerns were involved because the
States involved had set up a system of appeals asofnght but

- -=====----------

See supra p. - .
See also Bearden v. Georgia, U.S. - , (1983). We went
on in Ross to analyze the issue presented there-the right to counsel on
discretionary appeals-primarily in terms of the Equal Protection Clause.
See id., at 611. However, neither Ross nor any of the other cases in the
Griffin line ever rejected the proposition that the Due Process Clause exerted a significant influence on our analysis in this area.
11

12

I
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had refused to offer each defendant a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the merits of his appeal. Equal protection concerns were involved because the State treated a .
class of defendants-indigent ones-differently for purposes
of offering them a meaningful appeal. Both of these concerns were implicated in the Griffin and Douglas cases and
both Clauses supported the decisions reached by this Court.
Affirmed.
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January 7, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

No. 83-1378
Evitts v. Lucey

I do not plan to make any changes
in the circulated opinion in response ko
Bill's dissent.
Sincerely,

~nnt C!}ouri of tltt ~lb .i'tab.9'
~fti:nghtn. ~- <!}. 2llffe~~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

January 9, 1985

Re:

83-1378 - Evitts v. Lucey

Dear Bill,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

,jnpr.nnt QI&tltrl gf iltt ~~ ,jtattg

'1a1tqinghtn. ~- QI. 20ffe,.~
January 16, 1985
CHAMeERS Of"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

No. 83-1378 - Evitts, Superintendent v. Lucey

Dear Bill,
I will add this brief "snapper."
11

Few things have plagued the administration of criminal
justice, or contributed more to lowered public confidence in the
courts, than the interminable appeals, the retrials and the lack
of finality.

i 1Today, the Court, as Justice Rehnquist cogently points out,
adds another barrier to finality and one that offers no real
contribution to fairer justice. I join Justice Rehnquist in
dissenting. 1
1

rds,

r()~
Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

!

I

CHAM!l!:RS 01""

JUSTICE

w...

J . l!IRENNAN, JR.

January 17, 1985

No. 83-1378
Evitts v. Lucey

Dear Chief,
Thank you very much for your note
of January 16. I don't intend to make
any response. I assume, therefore, that
the case can come down on Monday next .by
which time I assume your "snapper" will
have been printed.
Sincerely,

A~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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